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Ecologies of Empire: From Qing Cosmopolitanism to Modern Nationalism 
 
Peter C. Perdue, Yale University 
 
This article is based on a keynote speech with the same title delivered at the “Bordering China: 
Modernity and Sustainability” Berkeley Summer Research Institute on August 3, 2012. 
 
Abstract 
 
According to modern ecological theory, ecosystems are fragile combinations of diverse 
elements, and their resilience—or ability to recover after external shocks—varies as the system 
develops. Under conditions of low resilience, the system can collapse unpredictably and shift 
into a new state. Biodiversity in ecosystems, however, helps to maintain resilience. These basic 
natural principles also help to illuminate the social processes of empires. Like ecosystems, 
empires expand, grow, and collapse unpredictably when they lose the ability to respond to 
external shocks. Just as biodiversity increases resilience, imperial formations prosper when they 
are more cosmopolitan, incorporating diverse cultural elements that foster institutional 
innovation, and they suffer collapse when they limit participation by outside challengers. The 
author develops this analogy between ecosystems and imperial formations through a discussion 
of the Ming and Qing empires, concluding with reflections on the Maoist production system and 
the current resilience of China today. 
 
Keywords: ecology, empires, environmental history, famine, Ming, Qing, China, Mao, 
resilience, sustainability, diversity 
 
The title “Bordering China: Modernity and Sustainability” links together three popular topics in 
the study of China today: (1) the frontiers and borderlands of China, past and present; (2) 
China’s modernization program and its connection to the imperial past; and (3) environmental 
history and environmental policy. How are these three themes connected? 
This article connects the theme of cosmopolitanism, including cultural diversity, to my 
own research on Chinese environmental history.1 Stevan Harrell and I gave seminars on 
ecological history in the United States in May and September 2012, and that summer I lectured 
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to a Chinese audience in Shanghai on the development of the field of environmental history, so 
this subject has been on my mind for a while. These are just a few sketchy observations, but I 
hope they may be useful in stimulating further research. 
Let me begin with a photograph of the great dust cloud that formed over China in 2007 
(figure 1). The particles in this cloud were blown over the Pacific and around the rest of the 
world, depositing particulates in California and elsewhere, crossing national borders, and 
affecting air quality in distant lands (Uno et al. 2009). Examining this cloud allows us to look at 
questions of modernity, borders, and environmental change. The cloud itself formed over the 
Taklamakan Desert, as strong winds blew desert sands into the high atmosphere. But other 
elements produced by China’s industrial boom have also entered into global circulation (Jaffe et 
al. 1999). These particulates are a product of two processes resulting from China’s reform 
program: global trade and domestic industrialization. The grasslands of Inner Mongolia have 
been heavily exploited to raise goats for the export of cashmere wool, and this in turn has caused 
desertification and produced sand that is blown into the atmosphere. The industrial pollution of 
coastal China has also contributed to toxic clouds. Thus this cloud illustrates the connection 
between our three themes of borders, sustainability, and modernity. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The great dust cloud of 2007. Source: GreenPacks (2009). 
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This article uses concepts from modern ecology to understand China’s historical and 
contemporary challenges in addressing environmental degradation and sustainability. I first 
outline a model of the adaptive cycle as applied to both small ecosystems and larger scales of 
human societies and then give a few examples of how we may frame our understanding of 
China’s environmental history using this model. This biological model stresses the importance of 
species and environmental diversity for sustainability and resilience. After introducing this 
model, I discuss the concepts of cosmopolitanism and diversity in the human cultural sense, to 
see if we can link these concepts to changes in material forms of Chinese states and economies in 
modern times. Thus, this article is about the ecology of empire in both natural and human senses. 
It raises questions such as: What production systems underlie the unity of Chinese empires and 
the modern Chinese state? How are different peoples and cultures kept together under imperial 
and national rule? And what happened to the diversity of Chinese social space during the 
transition from imperial to national regimes? 
Many observers have noticed the similarity between the territory of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), excluding Mongolia and Taiwan, and that of the Qing at its maximal degree of 
expansion. Moreover, modern-day China more nearly approximates the size of the empire from 
which it descends than any other nation-state left in the world. All other empires have broken up 
into many pieces. And China has long been a vast space composed of many regions, each with 
distinctive climatic, geographic, and cultural characteristics. These regions have persisted for 
centuries, despite a tumultuous history of imperial collapse and revolutionary upheaval. 
Some perspectives from modern ecological theory and environmental history can help us 
understand both China’s diversity and its repeated experiences of collapse and renewal. In short, 
periods of expansion in China’s imperial history generally corresponded to times of increased 
diversity of peoples and openness toward multiple perspectives, among both the elites and the 
masses. These periods were followed by briefer times of contraction and inwardness, during 
which hostility toward the outside world increased and internal dissent was repressed. These 
processes of expansion and contraction often proceeded in parallel with changing cultural 
horizons of openness and exclusion. 
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The Adaptive Cycle 
The adaptive cycle model was originally developed by the ecologist C. S. Holling and 
others in the 1970s to explain how ecosystems cycle between different stable states as they 
undergo sharp transitions between states.2 The r phase, called “exploitation,” describes a period 
when there is rapid dispersal and rapid growth of species competing with one another in an open 
area (like a meadow). This is followed by the K phase of “conservation,” a time of slower growth 
and protection of gains (for example, a climax forest). We can extend the model to embrace 
human economies as well as biological ecosystems. For an economic theorist, the r phase 
describes the activities of entrepreneurs, while the K phase describes bureaucratic consolidation. 
But as consolidation—whether natural or organizational—proceeds, the system becomes 
increasingly less resilient—that is, more vulnerable to external shocks. When a disaster strikes—
in the form of a forest fire, drought, or insect pests, or financial crises, or rebellion—the system 
shifts to the “release,” or omega (Ω) phase. The economist Joseph Schumpeter called this a 
process of “creative destruction”; China historians might call it dynastic collapse. 
After this collapse, there is a phase of “reorganization”—the alpha (A) phase—in which 
materials released by the collapse, like nutrients, are put back together to begin a new phase of 
growth. Pioneer species reseed a burned area; new plants grow in lakes and woodlands; and 
grasslands recover their vegetation. Then a new phase of growth begins, with a somewhat 
different combination of elements or a repetition of the previous process. 
The adaptive cycle resembles the traditional Chinese theory of the dynastic cycle. The 
two models share a focus on growth, loss of resilience, collapse, and reorganization under a new 
dynastic or biological regime. Like the dynastic cycle theory, the adaptive cycle model leaves 
open the question of whether the reorganization phase will lead simply to restoration of the 
previous system, or to the creation of a new ecosystem that operates on a larger scale, or with 
different elements, or with a different dynamic. It’s an intriguing parallel, but the adaptive cycle 
is rooted in natural science and not morality. The adaptive cycle model also shares some 
similarities with the Marxist idea that contradictions drive social and natural change, but it does 
not necessarily imply that the outcome of these contradictions is a higher stage of society. These 
three models share a general perspective that systems operate under conditions of dynamic 
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instability that are barely kept under control by natural or political forces. These models contrast 
with those of classical ecology and neoclassical economics, both of which were rooted in 
theories of static equilibrium derived from thermodynamics of the late nineteenth century. 
The first application of the adaptive cycle model, by C. S. Holling, looked at the 
relationship between spruce fir forests in eastern North America, an insect called the spruce 
budworm, and the birds that controlled the insects (Holling 1973; Gunderson and Holling 2002). 
There were two stable states: one with low budworm populations and young, growing trees and 
another with high budworm populations, mature trees, and extreme defoliation. Periodically, 
every 40 to 130 years, up to 80 percent of the spruce fir trees would die from budworm attacks in 
a natural cycle. The reason for the sudden flip from one state to another was the change in 
effectiveness of birds in keeping the budworm population down. As the foliage grew thicker on 
the maturing trees, the birds could not find the budworms as easily, so the budworm population 
would suddenly explode, thus damaging the trees and resetting the system. The famous biologist 
Rachel Carson, whose writings founded the modern American environmental movement, noted 
the disastrous consequences of massively destructive spraying of DDT to rid forests of the 
budworm in her now-classic book, Silent Spring (Carson 1962, 130–137). 
The case of the spruce fir forests, a simple model with only three actors, has had large 
implications. First, it showed that, contrary to earlier predictions by ecologists and economists, 
ecosystems do not naturally achieve equilibrium. Instead, they cycle unpredictably among 
different states, and the transitions between those states are sharp and catastrophic. The adaptive 
model has been confirmed for many other ecosystem processes, including eutrophication of 
lakes, growth of coral reefs, and the relationship in arid regions among grazing animals, 
grasslands, and woody shrubs (Gunderson and Holling 2002, 30–39). The model is not only a 
description of nature; it also has implications for how human societies can manage a natural 
system and how they should intervene in it. It strongly questions the idea that one can achieve a 
permanent stable state. Repeated, sporadic waves of “release,” or “creative destruction,” or 
“permanent revolution” seem to be embedded in nature. 
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Second, it points to the significance of resilience: the ability of a natural or social system 
to resist unpredictable shocks. Figures 2 and 3 reveal that the model is really a three-dimensional 
one, where the third dimension is the hidden parameter of resilience. 
 
  
 
Figure 2 (left). The adaptive cycle model. Source: Gunderson and Holling (2002, cover). 
 
Figure 3 (right). Resilience in the adaptive cycle. Source: Gunderson and Holling (2002, 41). 
 
A time of apparent expansion—of a forest, an empire, or an economy—can mask a 
period of reduced resilience, which in turn increases the threat of a catastrophic outcome. 
Gunderson and Holling distinguish between “engineering resilience” and “ecological resilience” 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002). Engineering resilience aims at achieving a fixed target, such as 
maximizing sustainable yield of a fishery—or, to use a Chinese example, maximizing grain 
output—while ignoring the effect that maximizing a single variable has on the entire system. 
Ecological resilience takes into account the interaction among multiple factors, not just a single 
one. The goal of sustainability is not simply to reach a fixed target but to remove the underlying 
factors that cause the adaptive cycle to have such severe results. 
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Managing the Yellow River 
 The management of the Yellow River provides an excellent analogue to the adaptive 
cycle and suggests how we might apply this model to a system that includes human intervention. 
The Yellow River carries a high load of silt, which is picked up from the loess soils of northwest 
China after heavy rainfall in a deforested region. As the rate of flow slows down in the North 
China Plain, the silt builds up. In a natural river, the silt would cause the river to meander across 
the flat plain. But beginning around the second century B.C.E., the humans who settled the North 
China Plain built large dikes around the river, for military purposes. Trapped by the dikes, the 
silt settled down in one place, causing the riverbed to rise. In response, Chinese settlers invested 
much effort in building the dikes even higher, and thus the system moved toward greater inputs 
of capital and labor (the K phase) in order to maintain the river’s flow. But the dikes would 
eventually break, causing catastrophic releases. The river would flood the plain, drowning and 
uprooting millions of peasant farmers. The riverbed would then shift, sometimes north or south 
of the Shandong Peninsula. “Reorganization” in this cycle meant mass migrations of farmers, 
destruction of farmland and villages, and great human suffering. Eventually, settlement would 
resume, and the cycle would begin all over again. This process, including human actors, closely 
resembles the abstract model of the adaptive cycle. As population density increased in North 
China over many centuries, the incidence of flooding grew more severe, but the essential 
dynamics of the cycle did not change for over a millennium (Elvin 1993, 30–33; Mostern 2013). 
But we have to add another element: sometimes the release phase was deliberately 
triggered by humans for political purposes. Several times in imperial history Chinese officials 
deliberately broke the dikes for strategic reasons. Song rulers did this in the eleventh century C.E. 
to stop the Liao invasions; Ming rulers did it in the sixteenth century to protect imperial ancestral 
tombs and grain transport; and Chiang Kai-shek notoriously broke the dikes in the twentieth 
century to stop the Japanese invasion of North China (Zhang 2009; Ma 2010; Muscolino 2010). 
In each case, this hydraulic warfare failed at immense human cost. These examples reveal one 
factor that differentiates human systems from natural ones: the ability of political elites to make 
ecological choices that have large consequences. In these cases, some of the consequences 
(causing the flood) were intended, but others (stopping the enemy) failed. In ecologists’ terms, 
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potential leaks away, and the system flips into a less productive and less organized form as a 
result of the intervention of elites concerned more with state power than with human welfare. 
 
Diversity and Sustainability in Ecosystems and Empires 
 The Yellow River example shows that ecosystems and empires are closely linked. 
Ecosystems and empires also share features of diversity that affect their ability to endure for long 
periods of time. As Gunderson and Holling concisely put it, “biodiversity contributes resilience 
to the functioning of an ecosystem” (2002, 406). The phases of highest external influence and 
greatest internal diversity correspond to the early periods of reorganization and expansion. For 
ecologists, these phases include the maximum potential for biological creativity, through the 
introduction of new species and new ecosystem functions. To understand the durability of 
empires and nations, we likewise need to consider cosmopolitanism and diversity. 
Cosmopolitanism implies openness to influences from abroad and willingness to respect 
differences. Diversity means promoting internal differentiation through policies of 
decentralization, indirect rule, and cultural pluralism. 
Theorists contend that empires are built by incorporating a wide variety of peoples and 
that empires support difference in their institutions and legitimating ideologies. The historians 
Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper state: 
 
Empires are large political units, expansionist or with a memory of power 
extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they 
incorporate new people. The nation-state, in contrast, is based on the idea of a 
single people in a single territory constituting itself as a unique political 
community. . . The nation-state tends to homogenize those inside its borders and 
exclude those who do not belong, while the empire reaches outward and draws, 
usually coercively, peoples whose difference is made explicit under its rule. The 
concept of empire presumes that different peoples within the polity will be 
governed differently. (2010, 8) 
 
The historical sociologist Charles Tilly likewise argues: 
 
An empire is a large composite polity linked to a central power by indirect rule. 
The central power exercises some military and fiscal control in each major 
segment of its imperial domain, but tolerates the two major elements of indirect 
rule: 1) retention or establishment of particular, distinct compacts for the 
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government of each segment; and 2) exercise of power through intermediaries 
who enjoy considerable autonomy within their own domains in return for delivery 
of compliance, tribute, and military collaboration with the center. (1997, 3) 
 
Every empire could accommodate radically different ecologies and cultures. The 
accidents of war and expansion brought diverse peoples under one imperial gaze. Because 
imperial borders are not fixed by ethnic criteria, empires by their nature must be set up to 
accommodate and manage difference. As the European historian Charles Maier notes, 
 
Imperial and national frontiers—even if of similar outward type—usually enclose 
different processes of governance and institutional structuration within their 
respective territories. The nation-state will strive for a homogeneous territory. . . . 
Because of their size, and their assumption of power over old states and 
communities, empires possess a far less administratively uniform territory. (2006, 
102) 
 
Burbank and Cooper point to the process of imperial expansion, which creates heterogeneous 
territories acquired through contingencies of war and diplomacy; Tilly stresses the use of indirect 
rule in imperial administration; and Maier remarks on the different kinds of commitments to 
frontiers in empires and nation-states. Each of them singles out one aspect of the contrast 
between imperial diversity and national homogeneity. 
Empires, of course, have been extremely long-lasting political structures, far more 
enduring than nation-states so far. As Burbank and Cooper write: 
 
Empire was a remarkably durable form of state. . . . By comparison, the nation-
state appears as a blip on the historical horizon . . . whose hold on the world’s 
political imagination may well prove partial or transitory. (2010, 2–3)  
 
This imperial combination of diversity and endurance suggests that, following the 
ecological perspective, we may draw an analogy between the role of biodiversity in sustaining 
resilient ecosystems and the contrasting effects of difference and homogeneity on the long-term 
survival of empires and nation-states. 
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Chinese Examples of Imperial and Ecological Dynamics 
 Such broad contrasts between the heterogeneous compositions of most empires and the 
tendencies toward homogenization and standardization generally seen in nation-states are 
plausible, but they neglect dynamics within imperial formations that can shift an empire’s 
orientation away from openness and diversity toward less expansive and more narrowly defined 
identities. 
Empires originate from conquests by composite elites, usually created in fluid frontier 
zones. The Ottoman Empire was founded in Anatolia by a mixed group of Byzantine Greeks, 
local adventurers, and Turkish military and nomadic forces. The early Muscovite Empire, 
similarly, mixed Russian, East European, and Tatar elements. The early Ming founder was a 
former Buddhist monk arguably influenced by Manichaean religious beliefs, who attracted a 
wide array of followers to his peasant armies and only later portrayed himself as an orthodox 
Confucian and attempted to repress his humble and heretical origins. Finally, the Manchu 
founders of the Qing expertly put together a multicultural coalition—including Manchu soldiers, 
Mongolian nomads, and Chinese settlers in southern Manchuria—to form the base for their 
conquest. As we can see, in early periods of empire there is usually considerable ethnic and 
material diversity. The empires in these examples, from their origins, also used techniques of 
indirect rule and multiple administrations, incorporating difference into their government 
structures and legitimating ideologies. 
But in the later phases of imperial development, after expansion ceases, there is often a 
tendency toward inwardness, rigidity, and lack of creativity, and the empire often ends with a 
major disaster, produced by ignorance, lack of resources, and blinkered political discourse. These 
phenomena of narrowness and fragility correspond to the culmination of the K phase of the 
adaptive cycle. The early Ming dynasty is a good example, and the story of Ming policy toward 
its borders reveals this polarity between openness and closure. 
 
Ming Expansion, Consolidation, and Decline 
 The Ming dynasty, after throwing off Mongol rule in the first half of the fifteenth 
century, expanded rapidly in all directions—both continental and maritime. The Yongle Emperor 
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(r. 1402–1424), a vigorous martial prince, invaded Mongolia five times and conquered Vietnam. 
He also launched the Zheng He expeditions, each of which carried over 25,000 troops and 250 
ships; these expeditions were intended to awe the peoples of the southern seas with Chinese 
military might, collect important trade goods and intelligence information, and intervene in local 
politics. Zheng He’s naval officers also collected exotic species, such as giraffes from Africa, for 
presentation to the Ming court. They expanded the geographic and biological knowledge of the 
Chinese elites. 
During this period, the Ming orientation to the world was cosmopolitan. It inherited the 
aspiration for universal empire from the Yuan dynasty, and it incorporated foreign people into its 
social structure. Zheng He himself was a Muslim, and his sailors had intimate familiarity with 
the many seafarers of the southern seas. Yongle incorporated surrendered Mongols into his 
armies, and he enjoyed vigorous campaigning in the steppe. Yongle built the great capital city of 
Beijing as the Ming’s second capital, balancing the orientation of the dynasty between the 
distinct regions of north and south. 
Shortly after Yongle’s death, the next emperor and his officials cancelled the Zheng He 
voyages, shut down coastal trade, and turned their attention to the Mongol threat in the 
northwest. In 1449, however, a later emperor suffered an embarrassing reversal when he led an 
ill-advised expedition into the steppes of Mongolia and was captured by the Mongol Khan. This 
could have meant the end of the dynasty, but the elites back in Beijing quickly reorganized the 
government and put the emperor’s brother on the throne, subjecting the hapless emperor to 
virtual house arrest once he returned. After the mid-fifteenth century, the Ming became much 
more inward oriented and defensive toward the northwest, while it also tried to shut down trade 
along the southern coast. The result was a loss of resilience and diversity: “pirates” flourished in 
the form of illegal traders, while nomads who were refused trading relations launched raids to get 
what they wanted. 
Once again the Ming imperial system faced crisis, but in the sixteenth century it 
reorganized itself for a second time. The wokou ?? (“dwarf pirate”) crisis of the mid-
sixteenth century, which coincided with increasingly large raids by Mongols in the northwest, 
shows how a regime threatened with near-complete loss of control on its periphery can creatively 
Perdue 15 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 8 (September 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-8) 
 
reorganize itself, assembling new elements to start a fresh phase of growth (Perdue 2013). The 
Ming court intensely debated policy toward the wokou. Moralistic agrarian Confucians asserted 
that the Ming should not tolerate foreign trade—legal or illegal—and that it should stamp out 
these smugglers and pirates. Other local officials realized two important things: first, that the 
Ming could not control the maritime coast, which was a mobile open area accessible to many 
different peoples, and second, that the “harboring hosts” (wozhu ??) among the gentry elite of 
southeast China provided the traders with warehouses, investment capital, and refuge from 
official crackdowns. The only possible solution was to negotiate with the traders and gentry 
elites by opening coastal trade, buying off the armed groups, and ensuring the prosperity of the 
southern coast. This cosmopolitan pragmatist solution, pioneered by the great Ming general Qi 
Jiguang, reduced the intensity of wokou raids. At the same time, in 1557, the Portuguese arrived 
on the southern coast looking for trading opportunities. At first they seemed to be no different 
from armed pirates to the Ming officials, but it is said that eventually they offered assistance in 
repressing the pirates, for which they were granted the leasehold on Macau. The Portuguese lease 
of Macau connected Ming China to the rest of the world, through the great silver flow that came 
from the mines of Latin America, across both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, through Manila, 
to Macau, and ultimately to the rest of China. This creative response initiated, or at least 
accelerated, the great commercial boom of sixteenth-century China. 
On the other hand, the building of the Great Wall, which occurred during the culmination 
of Ming defense policy, further limited the dynasty’s cultural perspectives. The costly wall 
reinforced static military positions, so combat skills declined. Since the Ming rulers had literally 
walled themselves off from the steppe, they lost crucial knowledge about Mongolian and 
Manchu political developments. Even though they issued trading licenses to rival Mongol 
leaders, they lost the ability to play those leaders against one another because they had 
inadequate intelligence. 
The popular historical documentary film Heshang ?? (Yellow River Elegy), produced 
in 1987, stresses the isolating impact of the Great Wall: 
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The Great Wall of the Ming dynasty . . . was naturally much stronger than the 
Great Wall of the Qin and Han dynasties. And yet it too exhausted the strength of 
the Ming and greatly hurt its vitality. . . . The majestic section of the Great Wall at 
Gubeikou pass was built by the famous general Qi Jiguang [who rebuilt the wall 
in the north, and also built a Great Wall along the coast to defend against the 
Japanese pirates]. . . . Qi Jiguang was the most talented military strategist of the 
Ming dynasty, but he has also left us with a great regret: why was it that the 
pirates of an island country could cross the seas to attack China, [and] the Europe 
of that time possessed an armed navy that pursued conquest in all directions, 
while China could think only of rebuilding the Great Wall? . . . In 1588 Qi 
Jiguang died amid poverty and illness, [but] at this very time, the invincible 
Spanish Armada was about to set out to conquer England and to open up a 
tumultuous new page in the history of the early modern world. (Bodman, Su, and 
Wang 1991, 127–129) 
 
Cosmopolitanism and Cooperation in the High Qing and After  
The most famous phase of cosmopolitanism, marked by the arrival of the Jesuits, 
corresponds with the expansive era of Kangxi. The greatest success in consolidation occurred in 
the mid-eighteenth century, with the definitive conquest and administrative incorporation of 
Mongolia and Xinjiang (figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Map of Qing Empire at its maximum. Source: Perdue (2005, 2). 
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At the same time, some open-minded individuals took advantage of the expanded limits of the 
Qing Empire to explore new horizons. One of these was Ji Yun (1724–1805), a top-ranking 
scholar and official exiled to Xinjiang from 1769 to 1771 because of political intrigue. On his 
return to the capital from Urumqi, he wrote a series of poems describing the exhilarating 
landscapes he had experienced during his exile (Ji and Li 2010). A long tradition of exile 
literature, extending at least as far back as the Tang dynasty, featured literati who lamented their 
distance from the imperial capital and described their frontier surroundings as barren wastelands. 
Ji Yun was different: he seems to have enjoyed the rude and energetic development of Xinjiang 
during this period. In one of his poems, he celebrates the new land clearance undertaken by 
military colonies, which brought verdant crops to the oasis of Urumqi: 
 
 
??????? 
??????? 
??????? 
??????? 
Autumn grain and spring wheat spread along the furrows 
It is green for several hundred miles down to the Crystal River 
On the thirty-four military colony fields interspersed like embroidery 
Everyone joins in to thresh the millet under the vast blue sky 
(Ji and Li 2010, 144#24) 
 
 
Ji’s enthusiasm demonstrates that some Qing officials exulted in the new possibilities 
created by this unprecedented expansion of territory and cultural heterogeneity. Yet ominous 
signs that the imperial mind was narrowing had already appeared. The repression of Christianity 
under the Yongzheng Emperor (r. 1723–1735) in the early eighteenth century showed an 
intolerance of dissenting religious sects that appeared to threaten imperial control. Yongzheng 
also launched an obsessive campaign against the obscure scholar Zeng Jing, in which he 
attempted to root out anti-Manchu sentiment from the Han Chinese gentry class through 
indoctrination and repression (Spence 2001). The Qianlong Emperor in the mid-eighteenth 
century promoted the greatest compilation of classical texts ever assembled, in the Siku Quanshu 
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(Complete Record of the Four Treasuries) project, at the same time purging from the canon any 
texts that hinted at anti-Manchu sentiment (Guy 1987). In the strange “soulstealers” sorcery scare 
of 1768, the Qianlong Emperor tried to track down an elusive group of wandering rebels who, he 
claimed, were cutting off the queues of Chinese people to promote an anti-Manchu rebellion. 
Despite the best efforts of his bureaucrats and a culture of fear and denunciation generated by 
this initiative, he never found any genuine queue-cutting rebels (Kuhn 1990). The evernormal 
granary system (changpingcang ???), which stored grain in all the counties of China to 
provide famine relief and price stabilization, expanded to an unmanageable size by the late 
eighteenth century, and much of the grain rotted from misuse or was diverted to other purposes 
(Will and Wong 1991). The frontier expansion of Han Chinese aroused great resentment both 
from native peoples who were displaced by the new settlers and from other Han migrants who 
fought with new migrants for land. A series of frontier rebellions broke out in the late eighteenth 
century, heralding the end of the flourishing age. In the eighteenth century, we find fascinating 
polarities between creativity and dogmatism, optimism and paranoia, and expansion and 
defensiveness, which characterize phases of growth and consolidation. 
Many historians have argued that the “flourishing age” of the high Qing demonstrates a 
dynamism embedded in the classical system that could produce great achievements in economic 
growth, social mobility, and literary and scholarly production, along with military conquest. But 
we still have not been able to explain adequately why the glories of the flourishing age turned 
into the humiliating experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Perhaps the resilience 
concept will help illuminate the sudden transformation of the high Qing into the beleaguered 
“sick man of Asia” of the nineteenth century. Robert Marks concludes that “the Chinese empire 
had reached its ecological limits . . . and was becoming deforested and experiencing the effects 
of ecological degradation” by 1800 (Marks 2012). Although we cannot estimate precisely the 
“resilience” of the Qing imperial system at the end of the eighteenth century, it is clear that 
beneath the surface of impressive economic growth, advances in scholarship, and mobilization of 
resources for social welfare was a more fragile equilibrium, losing its ability to resist the impact 
of environmental and external forces. 
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Nineteenth-Century Crisis and Creativity 
 During the nineteenth century, the consequences of Qing China’s declining resilience 
revealed themselves in a series of catastrophes, including losses to foreign powers, internal 
rebellions, administrative decay, and natural disasters. Yet even in this century of humiliation, 
the onset of China’s “omega” phase, we can find intriguing examples of interpersonal and 
international cooperation aimed at relieving the empire’s difficulties. One of these examples is 
related to coastal trade and central finance, the other to the drought-stricken interior and private 
philanthropy. 
These institutional innovations demonstrate continued creativity as well as the limits to 
possible change within the imperial system. From the traditional Chinese point of view, they 
indicated the chances for dynastic revival (zhongxing ??). From our ecological perspective, 
they added some resiliency to the system without fundamentally challenging its structure. Both 
kinds of reforms arose from crises on the borders, closely connected to challenges of reforming 
the state in the new imperial world of the late nineteenth century. 
In his classic first book, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast (1953), the Harvard 
historian of modern China John K. Fairbank described a process of intercultural negotiation that 
took place after the conclusion of the first Opium War. As a result of the treaties signed in 
Nanjing in 1842, the first of China’s unequal treaties, China opened its treaty ports and allowed 
British consuls to be stationed in the ports and fixed tariffs to be levied on imported goods. Both 
the British and the Chinese had great difficulty controlling trade along the coast, because many 
of the goods, such as opium, were illegal and because the traders were unsupervised boat people 
who wanted to evade customs duties. But the two nations had a joint interest in making the treaty 
system work. The British wanted to promote the legal trade, as well as the opium trade, while 
Chinese authorities wanted to collect customs duties as best they could. For a while, Qiying, the 
Manchu negotiator for the Qing, and Henry Pottinger, the British representative, were able to 
work together for common interests. Qiying’s approach was to stick to the limits of the treaty 
system while establishing close personal relations with Pottinger, in the classical spirit of 
“cherishing visitors from afar” (huairou yuanren ????). He asked for a picture of 
Pottinger’s wife and even offered to adopt his son. 
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But Qiying was soon replaced by Governor-General Ye Mingchen, who was much more 
hostile to Westerners, and Pottinger was replaced by John Bowring, who was first British consul 
in Hong Kong and then superintendent of trade in China. Bowring’s hard-line advocacy of 
complete free trade echoed the arguments expounded by adherents to the Manchester School of 
political economy, such as Richard Cobden and John Bright. Then the confrontations between 
the two sides grew much more harsh. As the illegal trade grew, Americans competed with British 
in the opium trade, and trade spread beyond the treaty ports up and down the coast. The treaty 
system was on the verge of collapse by 1850. Yet the system was rescued, in Fairbank’s view, by 
the establishment of the Chinese maritime customs in 1854. Robert Hart, an Irishman employed 
by the Qing court, set up a customs service with Chinese employees that was reliable, not 
corrupt, and efficient in delivering customs duties to the Qing state, while also enforcing 
payments on legal trade. Fairbank considered the maritime customs service, which lasted into the 
twentieth century, to be the prime example of “synarchy,” a hybrid institution in which both the 
Chinese and the British cooperated. Even though it was part of an unequal, semicolonial 
relationship, it shows that the two sides could bridge a large cultural gap guided by the 
leadership of a few extraordinarily cosmopolitan individuals. 
Chinese textbooks on modern history barely mention the maritime customs at all, and 
Western textbooks give them much less attention than they used to, but Fairbank’s example 
demonstrates the possibility of creative reorganization of the foreign trade system in the late 
nineteenth century.3 The customs service did not prevent the second Opium War in 1856, but it 
did provide vital revenue for the Qing modernization projects under the self-strengthening 
movement. It could stand as an example of adaptation that avoided a complete collapse of 
trading relations, through creative restructuring of Sino-foreign relations. Other provisions of the 
unequal treaties also performed a similar role. The historian Pär Cassel has argued in his recent 
book that the practice of extraterritoriality, or consular jurisdiction, was built on earlier Qing 
practices of multiple legal jurisdictions for Han, Manchu, and Mongol constituencies of the 
empire, and that Qing statesmen were able to use the provisions of the treaties to protect Chinese 
who lived abroad in Japan (Cassel 2012). 
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My second example—a more material one—illustrates an adaptive cycle that did go 
through a catastrophic boom and crash, one that was exacerbated rather than minimized by state 
action. The “incredible famine” (qihuang ??) of 1876 to 1879 was the result of a three-year 
drought in North China, which led to the deaths of nine to thirteen million Chinese farmers in the 
five northern provinces of Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, and Shandong. The famine itself was 
the culmination of a long period of decline that had struck this poor northern region since the 
eighteenth century. Shanxi was once a fairly prosperous region, with trade routes extending into 
Central Asia and famous bankers who financed commercial enterprise all over the empire. But 
the shift of trade routes to the coast damaged the areas dependent on inner-Asian trade, and the 
loss of strategic interest in the region after the completion of the eighteenth-century conquests 
meant that Shanxi and much of interior North China suffered from poor roads, underfinanced 
local administration, and low grain reserves to protect against drought. Its resilience had been 
severely undermined. 
Just before the drought, in 1874, the leading officials of the self-strengthening movement, 
Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) and Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885), had debated the relative importance 
of allocating military and economic resources between the coast and the interior (Hsü 1964–
1965). Li Hongzhang wanted to build up the Chinese fleets to face the rising threat of Japan, 
while Zuo Zongtang insisted on maintaining a large army to guard against expansion by Russia. 
In this debate, the two primary advocates of strengthening China’s economic and military 
resources clashed with each other, but neither of them focused on North China itself. Zuo 
Zongtang won a great deal out of this debate, and he was able to use his powerful army to drive 
out the Russians from the Ili valley in Xinjiang in 1878. Li Hongzhang received part of the 
money he had requested for his fleet as well. But when the drought struck, officials and 
missionaries trying to deliver grain supplies to the regions found that the roads were so poor, 
they could not get the grain there quickly enough. The self-strengtheners had completely 
neglected to repair the road system of North China, because their primary goals were military 
and economic defense. The ecological priorities of the Qing state had shifted: no longer was its 
primary goal the preservation of the independent Chinese farmer; instead, armies, navies, and 
modern industry took precedence (Perdue 2005). 
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But the famine also called forth a tremendous outburst of popular mobilization for relief 
by both Chinese and foreigners (Edgerton-Tarpley 2008). In the lower Yangzi, prosperous gentry 
families donated relief funds, in money or in grain, and published small pamphlets depicting  
starving peasants, which they used to pull at people’s philanthropic heartstrings. James Legge, 
the well-known translator of Chinese classics, also translated these illustrated pamphlets into 
English to help with fundraising in England and the United States (Committee of the China 
Famine Relief Fund 1878; “Tears from Iron”). Figure 5, a copy of one particularly graphic page 
from these pamphlets, depicts corpses abandoned on the roads being eaten by birds, and on the 
right indicates actual cannibalism. The money tree shown at the end of the pamphlet suggests all 
of the blessings the donor will receive in the next life if he gives money for relief (figure 6). The 
International Famine Relief Committee was one of the first international relief organizations (the 
ancestor of Live Aid concerts), and along with the Chinese gentry, these organizations occupied 
the role that the Chinese state could only partially fill. The participation in relief campaigns of 
gentry in cooperation with foreign donors represents a creative adaptation and merging of 
Confucian, Buddhist, and Christian cultures of charity in response to crisis. In sum, during the 
nineteenth century, the Qing social system continued to create adaptive responses to a series of 
severe challenges, giving the dynasty a surprisingly long duration in the face of nearly 
overwhelming difficulties. 
 
Famine and the Adaptive Cycle in Twentieth-Century China 
 My final example of the insights provided by the adaptive cycle model comes from the 
twentieth century, focusing on the Great Leap Forward and the famine that ensued, from 1958 to 
1961 (Harrell 2007). From today’s vantage point, the Great Leap looks like a paradoxical 
combination of extreme modern rationalism and wild superstition. While party leaders aimed at 
rapid economic development based on the key technological achievements of the Soviet and 
Western model—coal and iron—peasants melted down their cooking pots to make backyard 
steel and destroyed the agricultural system in pursuit of impossibly high yields. In the political 
scientist James Scott’s terms, it was a consequence of “high modernism” gone wild (Scott 1998).  
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Figure 5. Images of starvation and cannibalism. Source: Committee of the China Famine Relief 
Fund (1878). 
 
 
Figure 6. Blessing bestowed upon the generous. Source: Committee of the China Famine Relief 
Fund (1878). 
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Ecologists call it the primary error of “first stream science”—that is, bad engineering that ignores 
the interdependent properties of ecosystems (Gunderson and Holling 2002). The Great Leap tried 
to maximize short-term output of only two variables—grain and steel—while ignoring the 
relationship between these products and the rest of the system. The adaptive cycle struck back 
with a vengeance: nature was not impressed by communes, Mao Zedong and the Communist 
Party thought. Instead—as in the 1870s, but on a larger scale—famine struck large parts of 
China, with a death toll of at least thirty million people. We still do not understand the exact 
scope of the disaster, but in a recent book entitled Tombstone (Mubei ??), the Chinese scholar 
Yang Jisheng has documented a great deal of the suffering, using archival sources. The German 
historian Felix Wemheuer, relying on oral histories and local archives, has reconstructed the 
famine’s course through some of the most severely struck regions, and he has published a book 
comparing the Chinese famine to that of the Soviet Union in the 1930s (Wemheuer 2007, 2012; 
see also Yang 2012). 
These studies provide a great deal of evidence that basic ecological principles were 
violated. Farmers increased the areas for cultivating grain by “deep plowing”—or turning over 
the soil two to three feet deep—a practice that created “mounds of poisoned earth” by destroying 
soil nutrients, and by investing in hasty and shoddy irrigation works with large amounts of mass 
labor (Yang 2012). Moreover, the emphasis on growing grain meant reducing the output of fish, 
vegetables, and other crops deemed “nonessential.” Likewise, efforts to make backyard steel 
involved melting down local supplies of pots and pans and deforesting the countryside to create 
useless lumps of metal. The resulting famine represents a catastrophic “omega” phase of the 
agrarian cycle, and it was primarily caused by state action: the misallocation of human resources 
for misguided activity and the excessive extraction of grain to feed the urban population. 
We may also note the rigidity imposed by nationalist ideology on state policies. Even 
when Mao and the ruling elite became aware of the severity of the famine, they refused to cancel 
grain exports sent to the Soviet Union to pay for China’s industrial imports, because they 
believed doing so would be too humiliating, revealing China’s failure to progress fast enough 
economically to outstrip the Soviet Union, as Mao intended. And since at the outset of the Great 
Leap in 1958 Mao had provoked a crisis with the United States by bombarding the islands of 
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Quemoy and Matsu held by the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, he had precluded any option for 
getting aid from the West. 
Radical reorganization of the countryside occurred in the next phase, beginning in 1961. 
The communes were dismantled, private plots and market agriculture reappeared, and 
agricultural production recovered. But there were also damaging long-term ecological effects, 
especially deforestation and a proliferation of weak dams for water control. The bigger social 
effect was that the legitimacy of the Communist Party in the countryside was destroyed. No 
longer could the party convincingly claim to have brought prosperity to the Chinese people, 
except by suppressing all information about the famine and repressing all of its nonofficial 
critics. The economist Mao Yushi of Tsinghua University has recently calculated that China’s 
per capita GDP was actually less in 1976 than in 1949, taking into account unreported losses due 
to famine (Mao 2012). His estimate may be an exaggeration, but it is at least somewhat 
plausible. It took another cycle of political upheaval and collapse, including the ten lost years of 
the Cultural Revolution, before the party under Deng Xiaoping could finally regain its position 
by allowing peasant farmers to openly pursue wealth without suffering political attacks. 
How resilient is China now, after thirty years of the reform program? There is no doubt 
that the reform program begun by Deng Xiaoping has ushered in an extraordinary period of 
economic growth, lasting nearly three decades; as a result China’s GDP has leapt to become 
second in the world. This development depends on yet another radical reorganization of the 
Chinese productive system, however, relying on new elements that were unforeseen by Deng and 
his planners. The most conspicuous of these are heavy dependence on foreign direct investment, 
exports from coastal factories to Western industrialized countries, and the massive flow of labor 
out of the countryside to factories on the coast. The latter constitutes one of the largest 
migrations in all of human history, and it could mean the end of rural China. By some measures, 
China is already at least 40 to 50 percent urban; if you include the rural migrants, up to two 
hundred million of them, in the urban count, that figure goes up to 60 to 70 percent. 
Some optimistic analysts extrapolate from this period to predict that China will soon 
overtake the United States in GDP level. But one thing the adaptive cycle shows is that linear 
extrapolations are unlikely to happen. Rapid growth also brings with it internal strains and 
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concealed loss of resilience that eventually undermine the original sources of growth. So we 
should ask whether China is becoming more or less resilient over time, and whether it is 
generating enough intellectual resources, including cosmopolitan creativity, to handle its future 
challenges. So far, the response of the top leadership, and many prominent intellectuals, has been 
disappointingly unimaginative. Three brief comments will illustrate the limits on creative 
thinking in contemporary China. 
First, the political system is closed. Despite the call of former Premier Wen Jiabao for 
political reform, echoing that of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in earlier times, the party as a 
whole seems devoted primarily to preserving its power position, not to responding to popular 
pressure. We have just seen the meteoric rise and fall of Bo Xilai, a man who enthusiastically 
promoted the collective singing of Mao songs. Invocation of totalitarian nostalgia for the 1950s 
combined with nationalist victim narratives is the party’s last resort for gaining credibility. 
Second, environmental pressures are increasing. There has been a constant lack of water 
for North China, and the response to this decades-long drought has been not to push water 
conservation, but to create even larger engineering projects, like the great transfer of water from 
south to north (Nanshui Beidiao ????). This is a broad technological solution aimed at 
keeping the existing system in place, with dense populations and high levels of water usage in 
cities and farms, still based on policies of developmental modernism reminiscent of the 1960s. 
Third, China is much more dependent on the outside world for resources and markets 
than ever before. It can develop only in an open trading order, where it is free to export its 
products based on cheap labor and to buy the energy resources it needs for industrial growth. The 
United States is still by far the world’s dominant military and economic power, and its presence 
in Asia ensures stability. But there are ominous signs of patriotic frenzies expressed on the 
Internet and in public demonstrations—including, in particular, attacks on Japanese people and 
sometimes on Americans. The understanding of modern Chinese history as nothing more than a 
tale of unilateral victimization of China by rapacious foreigners stokes emotions but radically 
distorts the complex story of the past. This view leaves no place for a Robert Hart, or even a Li 
Hongzhang, who signed treaties with Japan and the West in order to enable China’s 
modernization. It celebrates the violent, superstitious Boxers and other radicals who endorsed 
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vengeance and destruction, at the expense of reformers, cosmopolitan intellectuals, and 
transnational businesspeople. 
The ongoing cultural war over China’s modern history pulls its contestants in 
contradictory directions. Mao Yushi (1929– )—the nephew of one of China’s most famous 
engineers, Mao Yisheng (1896–1989)—for example, trained first as an engineer at Shanghai 
Jiaotong Daxue and later studied economics. In his youth, he says, he was “boundlessly loyal” to 
Mao Zedong, but he was jailed as a rightist in the 1950s for criticizing the policies leading to the 
Great Leap Forward. In 2011, he published an online article entitled “Restore Mao Zedong as a 
Human Being,” which savagely criticized Mao as a selfish, domineering, even insane autocrat 
who caused the deaths of fifty million people by launching the Great Leap Forward and a 
constant series of violent political campaigns and never felt the slightest bit of remorse. The 
article was quickly taken down, but it had already circulated widely. Following this, ten thousand 
leftist scholars, including the niece of Mao Zedong, presented a petition demanding that Mao 
Yushi be fired, and others threatened to beat him up. In 2012, he was awarded the Milton 
Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty by the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. Mao Yushi has 
also advocated enacting taxes and other measures to lower China’s carbon emissions, and he has 
openly declared that China must sacrifice some of its rapid GDP growth rate in order to address 
deep environmental crises. Mao Yushi represents a more cosmopolitan, international perspective 
than his critics, who invoke Mao Zedong as their model, but the controversy over these two 
approaches to sustainability and economic growth has become quite heated in recent years. 
On the one hand, if the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution represent the 
periods of China’s maximal isolation from the world, and if, as former Premier Wen Jiabao has 
said, the “pernicious influence” of the Cultural Revolution still survives in China today, then 
China is still threatened by a rising tide of totalitarian nostalgia evoking a utopian image of the 
socialist years. On the other hand, intellectuals from the international tradition of free thought 
reaching back to the late Qing dynasty still advocate studying “problems not isms” (Mao Yushi, 
echoing Hu Shi), and empirical approaches to pressing issues of environmental preservation, 
social justice, and political freedom. In the past, China has developed the most when it creatively 
adopted elements of cultural traditions originating outside the Han core, including Central Asian 
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military and administrative practices, Western technology and bureaucracy, and foreign capital 
and culture. No one can predict the future evolution of the Chinese system, but we can guess that 
greater openness to innovation in cultural and intellectual arenas will increase the resiliency of 
the system and its ability to respond creatively to future challenges. 
 
Peter C. Perdue is professor of history at Yale University. The author is especially grateful to 
Yangwen Zheng for the invitation to speak at Manchester and to Wen-hsin Yeh for the invitation 
to speak at Berkeley. He also appreciates the responses from the audiences in both places. 
 
                                                 
 
Notes 
 
1 This paper is based on keynote lectures given at the “Conference on Cosmopolitan 
China,” Manchester University, May 16, 2012, and at the “Bordering China: Modernity 
and Sustainability” conference, UC Berkeley, July 31, 2012.  
2 Holling’s model is one of a number of efforts to theorize the operation of complex 
adaptive systems. For a general discussion of the biosphere as such a system, see Levin 
(1999). 
3     For a recent study of the maritime Customs in the twentieth century, see Brunero (2006). 
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